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Abstract 
 
 
Starting with Mirrlees (1971) and Vickrey (1945), the optimal tax literature has 
studied the design of a personal income tax. The ideal would be to tax 
earnings ability. Earnings ability is unobservable for tax purposes, however, 
and past papers have focused instead on designing a tax on labor income. 
Existing tax bases, though, depend on a broader range of information about 
each individual. In principle, this supplementary information can help in 
designing a tax that has more attractive distributional properties, by more 
closely approximating an ability tax. The objective of this paper is to lay out 
theoretically and estimate empirically how to make best use of available 
information about each individual in addition to earnings, when constructing 
a tax base that is most attractive on distributional grounds.  
 
To begin with, we find that the current tax base does slightly less well than 
the far simpler tax base equal just to a couple's joint earnings. In accordance 
with current practice, we find that the optimal tax base should include capital 
income, at least to some degree. In contrast to current practice, property tax 
payments and mortgage interest payments should not be deductible, since 
these deductions are costly on equity and presumably on efficiency grounds. 
We also find that joint filing and separate filing by a couple have similar 
consequences on equity grounds. 
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The choice of a personal income tax consists ﬁrst of the choice of a tax base and then the choice
of a tax rate schedule. The past literature on the optimal design of the income tax, as exempliﬁed by
Vickrey (1945) and Mirrlees (1971),1 presumes that the ideal tax base is the earnings ability (wage
rate) of each individual, since this is the only characteristic that is assumed to diﬀer across people. In
practice, however, earnings ability cannot be monitored for tax purposes. A close observable proxy
for earnings ability is labor income (wage rate times hours of work), so that the initial optimal
tax literature presumed that labor income is the natural choice of a tax base and then derived the
optimal rate schedule given this tax base.
Are there any welfare gains, though, from including in the tax base not just labor income but
also other observable information about individuals? Actual tax bases certainly include information
beyond labor income, such as interest, dividend, and capital gains income. In addition, by taxing
couples as a unit rather than taxing each spouse separately, the labor income of one's spouse aﬀects
one's own tax rate. Mortgage and property tax payments are allowed as deductions for those who
itemize. The tax base is certainly more complicated than labor income. To what degree can these
additional elements in the tax base be explained based on an optimal income tax framework, without
adding subsidiary objectives or externalities?
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) derive conditions under which the ideal tax base should not make
use of information about consumption of other goods, and include just labor income.2 One key
condition is that consumption goods not diﬀer in the degree to which they are complements to
leisure. A second condition is that the amount an individual consumes is not correlated with the
individual's marginal utility of income, conditional on earnings. It is this second condition that we
test.
Are there consumption choices that reveal information about ability beyond what is revealed
by reported earnings? The tagging argument of Akerlof (1978) in the context of welfare programs
presumes so; for example Besley and Coate (1992) argue that providing low-quality in-kind rather
than cash transfers help reveal who among low earners has low earnings ability, on the presumption
that only those with low earnings ability are in fact willing to consume low quality goods. Similarly,
Blomquist and Christiansen (2005) argue that users of excludable public goods should be charged a
price diﬀerent from marginal cost to the degree that demand depends on earnings ability. Kopczuk
(2001) argues that tax avoidance should be facilitated if the low skilled can avoid taxes more easily
than the high skilled, conditional on labor income. Closer to the choice of income tax base, Gordon
(2004) argues that income from savings (dividends or interest income) should be part of the tax
base to the degree to which those with high ability save more (or in diﬀerent forms) than those with
low ability, among those with the same labor income.
Are there observables that help detect high vs. low wage rates among individuals with the
same labor income? The ﬁrst objective of this paper is to explore empirically using PSID data to
what degree the observable variables that are commonly part of the income tax base help forecast
earnings ability (wage rates) among those with any given level of labor income. The variables we
1For recent work in this tradition, see Saez (2001) and Gruber and Saez (2002)
2For more recent attempts to explicate this result, see Saez (2002), Laroque (2005), and Kaplow (2006).
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focus on are interest and dividend income, the labor income of one's spouse, and expenditures on
mortgage interest and property taxes.
Why might it be plausible that individuals with the same labor income but diﬀerent underlying
abilities choose diﬀerent consumption patterns? Possible reasons include:
a) Among those with any given level of labor income, those with higher earnings ability may
save more.3 Higher income from savings then signals higher earnings ability.
b) Conditional on labor income, individuals with higher ability may own a larger house, and so
have a larger mortgage, perhaps due to sorting across locations based on ability/education.
c) Holding labor income ﬁxed, those with higher wage rates have more leisure, so have higher
potential labor income to help in the event of income shocks. This may make it easier to invest
in riskier securities, suggesting that higher wage-rate individuals will have more dividend income,
holding labor income ﬁxed.
d) Among those with any given level of labor income, those with higher earnings ability are
likely to value education for their kids more highly, so will live in communities with higher public
school spending and therefore higher property taxes.
e) The labor supply of secondary earners is very heterogeneous, with some out of the labor
force and others working full time. Despite the sensitivity of the participation decision of secondary
earners to their wage rate, their observed earnings are only weakly linked to wage rates. Due to
assortative mating, however, the earnings ability of spouses are highly correlated. The earnings of
the primary earner can then provide valuable supplementary information about the earnings ability
of the secondary earner, even conditional on that individual's reported earnings.
f) Within a couple, there may be some specialization in market work vs. work within the house-
hold, so that the higher wage-rate spouse increases labor supply while the lower-wage spouse focuses
more on non-market activities. As a result, a low-earning spouse may signal high hours for the pri-
mary earner, so a lower wage rate than would otherwise have been expected given observed labor
income.
Our results show that all of the additional observations we examine help in forecasting wage
rates, even after controlling for labor income. Property tax payments are particularly useful. Capital
income also helps forecast wage rates.
The second main objective of the paper is to solve for how this information should be used in
the design of the tax base, trading oﬀ any resulting equity gains vs. eﬃciency costs. Finally, the
paper reexamines the data to provide evidence needed in choosing the tax base suggested by the
theory.
The outline of the paper is as follows. We begin in section 1 with a general discussion of an
ability tax. In particular, to what degree should any of the underlying diﬀerences across individuals
in addition to diﬀerences in earnings ability aﬀect the ideal tax base? The analysis in the rest of
this paper follows the past literature in presuming that the ideal tax is an ability" tax, but this
3This could be the case, for example, if those with high ability tend to discount future utility less severely, a
possibility focused on in Diamond and Spinnewijn (2010).
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section at least highlights questions that might be raised about this characterization of the ideal
tax.
Section 2 provides some preliminary empirical evidence on the extent to which observable infor-
mation in addition to own labor income helps forecast an individual's earnings ability, as measured
by the wage rate, using data from the PSID.
Section 3 then generalizes the standard optimal tax model to allow for multiple sources of infor-
mation about the individual, and derives expressions characterizing the optimal tax base. Section 4
makes use of these expressions and the PSID data ﬁrst to test whether the existing tax base makes
optimal use of available information and then to approximate the tax base that would be most
attractive on equity grounds. Section 5 then discusses the resulting equity vs. eﬃciency trade-oﬀ,
and draws several conclusions about tax reforms that might be attractive on both equity and eﬃ-
ciency grounds. Our estimates suggest that capital income should be included to some degree in
the tax base on equity grounds, complementing ﬁndings in studies such as Conesa et al. (2009) that
it should be included on eﬃciency grounds. In addition, we ﬁnd that reducing the deductibility of
property tax and mortgage payments can be justiﬁed on both equity and eﬃciency grounds. Finally,
our results imply similar equity consequences of joint and separate taxation of couples.
1 Is an ability" tax the ideal tax?
In order to assess the appropriate tax base, the past literature has focused on a utilitarian objection
function, where welfare depends on the sum of individual utilities plus some function of tax revenue.
Individual utilities are commonly assumed to diﬀer only due to diﬀerences in earnings ability. Those
with higher ability are presumed to have a lower marginal utility of income.4
The optimal tax literature then presumes that ability" cannot be monitored for tax purposes.
It instead focuses on labor income as the tax base: labor income is the key observable variable linked
to earnings ability, since it equals the individual's wage rate times hours of work. The optimal tax
then trades oﬀ equity gains with eﬃciency costs from discouraging labor supply.
Of course, individuals diﬀer in behavior for many reasons beyond diﬀerences in earnings ability.
Tastes for consumption vs. leisure, tastes for consuming now vs. in the future, tastes for housing and
local public services vs. other goods, all can diﬀer among individuals with the same labor income.
Given these multiple diﬀerences across individuals, how compelling is it to assume that marginal
utilities of income diﬀer across individuals only due to diﬀerences in earnings ability, the implicit
assumption in the past optimal tax literature? Do diﬀerences in tastes convey further information
about marginal utility of income, condiitonal on earnings ability?
Consider, for example, an additively separable utility function: Uh(Ch) − Vh(Lh), where Lh
denotes labor supply for individual h, Ch = whLh measures her consumption, while wh is her hourly
wage rate (her earnings ability). In equilibrium, each individual supplies labor until whU
′
h = V
′
h.
4The shape of this function is key in any quantitative discussion of the optimal tax rate schedule, although
qualitative results need not depend on it.
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Given wh, chosen hours can be higher because the utility cost of time at work, V
′
h, is lower
evaluated at any particular Lh, or because U
′
h is higher at any given value of Ch. In the ﬁrst case,
the equilibrium marginal utility of income, U ′h, is lower, whereas in the latter case the equilibrium
U ′h is higher. Variation in stamina (V
′
h) or in needs (U
′
h) both yield the same observable outcomes,
so cannot be distinguished based on data for Ch, Lh, and wh.
The optimal tax literature usually assumes that U ′h diﬀers across people simply due to diﬀerences
in wh, so that U
′
h is the same regardless of chosen hours of work. This in eﬀect assumes that whether
the variation in behavior is due to variation in needs or in stamina is unobserved and equally likely.
If, for any given wage rate, hours in fact vary across people primarily because of variation in stamina,
then those with higher hours have a lower equilibrium value of U ′h, justifying on equity grounds a
tax on those who work more. Conversely, hours could vary across individuals due to variation
in needs, so that those working more should be treated more leniently. In either case, there are
other dimensions beyond ability aﬀecting the marginal utility of income (diﬀerences in needs and
stamina), raising a question of how to combine these indicators to deﬁne the underlying marginal
utility of each individual.5
Similarly, those who choose to save more could do so because the marginal utility of consuming
now is lower, or conversely because the marginal utility of consuming later is higher. In the ﬁrst case,
those who save more have lower marginal utility of income, given earnings ability, and conversely.
By focusing on earnings ability, we view each of these two alternative scenarios as equally
likely. Formally, we assume that observed labor supply, savings, or other choices reveal no infor-
mation about an individual's marginal utility of income, given their wage rate. An individual's
marginal utility of income at the observed allocation is simply assumed to depend on their wage
rate.6
Similarly, are there equity grounds for taxing an individual diﬀerently depending on her marital
status, or the earnings ability of her spouse, given her own earnings ability? Marrying, or marry-
ing a higher wage spouse, could in principle reﬂect a diﬀerent dimension of ability: attractiveness as
a possible mate. Conversely, marrying (or marrying a more able spouse) can just reﬂect a willing-
ness to put up with a lot in order to have access to the extra income. Even if we presume the same
utility level for individuals who make diﬀerent choices, the individual with a higher earning spouse
may have a lower marginal utility of income. Whenever an individual has an unusually high-earning
spouse, though, the spouse has an unusually low-earning mate. While this argument suggests treat-
ing the low-earnings spouse as having a lower marginal utility of income, given earnings ability,
it simultaneously suggests treating the high-earning spouse as having a higher marginal utility of
income. On net, assuming that the overall ability of the couple is unaﬀected by the nature of the
5One observable reason for having less stamina could be poorer health, providing a rationale for treating those
with poorer health more favorably under the tax law. Health problems, though, can also directly aﬀect U ′h.
6This normalization of utility functions is parallel to but not identical to the approach used in Weinzierl (2009). The
diﬀerence is that Weinzierl instead assumes that marginal utilities of income are equal for those with the same wage
rate at the laissez-faire allocation (without taxes), implying that marginal utilities diﬀer at the observed allocation
among those with the same earnings ability, due to the diﬀerential eﬀects on utility of taxes (and presumably of the
associated changes in government spending and in market prices) arising from heterogeneous preferences.
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match is a not unreasonable choice.
What impact do children have on an individual's earnings ability? From one perspective, the
decision to have children is analogous to the decision to allocate time/resources to other activities,
and in these other cases we have assumed equal marginal utility of income regardless of the choices
made. Even if we maintain that assumption here, though, children can aﬀect social welfare directly,
and not simply through their eﬀect on the utility of the parents. Transfer programs in fact often
seem to direct resources towards poor children in particular, and not just towards poor families,
e.g. aid to families with dependent children, EITC (where beneﬁts are heavily dependent on the
presence of children), SCHIP, and even Medicaid (where most of the expenditures are on children.
In order to avoid dealing with children in the analysis, our assumption will be that the current
treatment of children in the law handles appropriately the implications of children for ability to
pay. We take these provisions as given, and focus on the rest of the tax base.
Following the past literature, we therefore stick with the assumption that marginal utilities diﬀer
across people at the observed allocation due just to diﬀerences in earnings ability. Given this ability,
some have chosen to marry and some not, some work longer hours and others shorter hours, and
some consume now and others consume later. Regardless, all are assigned the same marginal utility
of income if they have the same earnings ability.
A second key assumption we make is that earnings ability can be approximated by an indi-
vidual's wage rate. There can be many reasons, though, why ability diﬀers from observed wage
rates. To begin with, some individuals choose more pleasant jobs (being a professor?) rather than
higher paying but less pleasant jobs (being an investment banker?). The observed wage rate then
does not fully characterize the range of possible jobs the individual could have taken.
Education and on-the-job training also aﬀect wage rates. If we take into account the foregone
income and the out-of-pocket costs of education, though, then we would still measure the degree to
which some individuals have better options than others.
Observed wage rates also leave out nonwage but still monetary compensation. We have no
information, for example, about employer pension contributions or compensation through options
or stock. In addition, the labor-contracting literature suggests that wage rates can diﬀer period by
period from earnings ability, even if their present values correspond. While there is a long tradition
in labor economics of using the market wage rate as a measure of earnings ability, we do recognize
the possible omissions.
2 Forecasting wage rates based on observables
Building on Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), Saez (2002) shows that one key assumption needed for
excluding consumption choices from the tax base is that these choices do not help forecast the
individual's marginal utility of income, after controlling for labor income. This is testable if wage
rates are a reasonable proxy for ability and marginal utility depends on ability only. The objective
of this section is then to see to what degree observable information now part of the income tax base
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helps forecast wage rates even controlling for labor income.7
Our data were taken from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. We included all individuals
between ages 18 and 65 observed in any year between 1968 and 2001 who were not self-employed
during that year.8,9,10 We restricted the sample to the Survey Research Center subsample, in order
to have a random representative sample.
Let Zht denote reported wage and salary income of individual h at time t. For wht, we normally
used Zht divided by reported hours of work during the year. When reported hours of work were
low, however, we worried that this measure could be quite noisy, and of course it is undeﬁned if
hours equal zero. For cases with hours worked in the year below 500, we imputed wage rates based
on a regression forecasting log(wage rate) as a function of individual ﬁxed eﬀects, year dummies,
and age dummies, estimated separately by gender.11,12
In the empirical work we focus on a short list of income sources and expenditures for each
individual that are in current use in the personal tax base, in addition to own labor income. In
particular, we focus on: spouse's labor income, interest income, dividends, mortgage payments, and
property tax payments. Since these are in current use, we face no need to assess whether they can
be observed for tax purposes.13 These variables are all reported directly in the PSID. All monetary
variables were converted to real 2001 dollars using the consumer price deﬂator.
In estimating the relationship between this list of observables and wage rates, we restricted our
sample to married couples. The sample of single individuals is particularly heterogeneous, consisting
largely of the very young and the very old, along with some divorcees and never-married middle-aged
individuals, so can yield results that vary substantially over time as sample composition changes due
to changes for example in life expectancy and divorce rates. We deﬁned an individual as married
if he/she had been married at any point during the year.
7Building on the approach introduced in this paper, Pirtillä and Suoniemi (2010) pursue analysis similar to the
one in this section using Finnish data.
8We chose 18 as an initial age so as to include the foregone earnings due to a college education. Time spent in
school is viewed as uncompensated work rather than leisure, so earns a zero wage rate.
9For the self-employed, observed earnings are a noisy and misleading measure of earnings ability, since earnings
can show up as dividends, capital gains, or royalty payments as well as wage income.
10We use the data from 1968 and 2001 to construct our variables but in the actual empirical speciﬁcations we rely
on observations between 1994 and 2001 because interest and dividend income cannot be observed separately before
1994.
11For those ﬁrst entering the labor force after age 18, we discounted their initial observed wage rate by 10% per
year to construct wage rates back to age 18, on the presumption that the return to education/maturity was roughly
10% per year.
12Wage and salary income of course is only one form of compensation. Unfortunately, we have no data on fringe
beneﬁts such as employer-ﬁnanced pension contributions, or other non-wage forms of compensation.
13Other indicators not in current use in the tax code, may also be helpful in forecasting wage rates, given labor
income. Examples could be age, gender, race, ethnic background, region of residence, or even height. (See Mankiw
and Weinzierl (2010) for an analysis of the optimal taxation of height, Alesina et al. (2007) for an analysis of gender-
dependent taxes, and Weinzierl (2010) for an analysis of age-dependent taxes.) Since these indicators are not in
current use for tax purposes, though, we do not examine their potential role. Perhaps policies that rely on them are
deemed horizontally inequitable and hence are not a part of the policy toolkit for reasons not explicitly accounted
for by the utilitarian framework.
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Under U.S. tax law, married individuals normally ﬁle a joint tax return though, for example, in
Canada and the U.K. they each ﬁle a separate return. We will ultimately examine whether separate
or joint ﬁling provides a better tax base. Let us ﬁrst presume separate ﬁling, and forecast the
wage rate of each married individual as a function of own labor income and couple's earnings from
ﬁnancial assets and their joint expenses for property tax and mortgage interest payments.
In these initial tests, we estimate nonlinear regressions of the form
wht = f(Zht +Xhtα) + ˜ht (1)
Here, wht is the wage rate of individual h in year t, Zht is this individual's labor income that year,
Xht is a vector of other information about this individual, and ˜ht is an iid error term.
The relationship between wage rates and observables can be highly nonlinear. To allow for this,
we introduce an unconstrained function f(.) relating the observable information to the wage rate.14
The estimation procedure is semi-parametric minimum least squares. In particular, we use a kernel
estimator for the function f(.), with the bandwidth chosen following the procedure recommended in
Härdle et al. (1993). The estimates for the function f(.) will be of direct interest, since they describe
the strength of the local link between the tax base and the wage rate. Under this speciﬁcation, we
expect substantial heteroskedasticity in the error term. To deal with this, we use a type of GLS
procedure also suggested by Härdle et al. (1993). In the ﬁrst stage, we estimate equation (1) as
written. We then forecast the square of the resulting residuals as a function of the square of the
estimated value of f(Zht +Xhtα). Finally, we weight observations by the inverse of the forecasted
standard deviation for ˜ht in a second stage regression. Reported results come from this second-stage
regression.
The function Bht ≡ Zht + Xhtα characterizes the tax base that most closely approximates an
individual's earnings ability. In column 1 of Table 1, we report estimates for α when forecasting
the wage rate for each married individual as a function of own labor income, the couple's income
from interest and dividends, and the couple's joint expenses for property tax and mortgage interest
payments. If the assumptions in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) are right, the coeﬃcients α should all
be insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. In contrast, we ﬁnd that all of the coeﬃcients of these sup-
plementary variables are statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The most striking coeﬃcient
is that on property tax payments. One interpretation is that, controlling for own labor income and
mortgage payments, those with a higher wage rate demand more local public services, presumably
better schooling for their kids. Those with higher wage rates (controlling for own labor income)
also have more interest and dividend income.15 Note that when the forecasted wage rate is higher,
forecasted hours of work are lower.
Those with higher mortgage payments also seem to have higher wage rates, controlling for the
other variables. Perhaps individuals tend to sort across communities based on ability, with more
expensive houses in higher ability communities.
14This function is normalized so that the coeﬃcient on Zht by construction equals one.
15Perhaps, those with higher wage rates give more weight to future utility, so save more even controlling for current
labor income. This is the setting examined by Golosov et al. (2010) and by Diamond and Spinnewijn (2010) . See
Banks and Diamond (2010) for a summary of the empirical evidence consistent with this pattern.
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In column 2, we report comparable estimates for the special case in which we constrain the
function f(.) to be linear, so that the speciﬁcation is equivalent to ordinary least squares. The
coeﬃcients are similar to those in column 1. Inspection of the estimated function f(.) reveals that,
for most of the earnings distribution, it in fact is quite close to being linear.16
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 1, we report equivalent results for two subsamples. In column 3 (4),
the sample consists of the higher (lower) earning individual within each couple. Hours of work vary
much less among the higher earning spouses, so that own labor income alone does a much better
job of forecasting wage rates. Since there is little unexplained variation in the wage rates among the
higher earnings spouses, it is not surprising that the other variables have small coeﬃcients. Only
interest income still enters strongly, while the sign of the coeﬃcients on mortgage and property tax
payments are now negative. Plausibly, the higher earner in a couple that wants better housing or
better schooling for their kids works longer hours in order to pay the required extra property taxes,
implying a lower wage rate than otherwise expected given observed labor income.
In the results for lower earning spouses reported in column 4, however, all of the variables help
in forecasting wage rates. Property tax payments in particular play a major role. Perhaps the
secondary earners most concerned about education also choose low or even zero hours of work, in
order to care for the kids. In order to check on the role played by spouses who were out of the labor
force, we reestimated this speciﬁcation on the subsample of lower-earning spouses who had positive
hours of work. In these results (available on request), the coeﬃcients are each roughly half as large,
suggesting that an important role for these variables is in forecasting the wage rate for those who
are out of the labor force.
Column 5 reports equivalent results presuming joint rather than separate ﬁling. Here the de-
pendent variable is the average wage rate of husband and wife, while labor income equals their
combined earnings and the other variables equal their joint income from capital and their joint
expenses. Again, the key additional indicators of use in forecasting wage rates are interest income
and property tax payments.
Column 6 tests whether the labor income of the secondary earner should enter with a diﬀerent
weight when trying to forecast average wage rates of the couple. Given that the lower earning
spouse presumably works fewer hours, we should expect a higher coeﬃcient on this spouse's labor
income, since the coeﬃcient converting wH to w should be proportional to 1/H. In contrast, our
estimated coeﬃcient for the labor income of the secondary earner is 1 − .41 = .59, compared to a
weight of one on the labor income of the primary earner. A natural explanation for this result is
that hours of work are more random among secondary earners, making this indicator for the wage
rate much less informative.17
16Figure 1 provides a graph of this function for one of the other speciﬁcations.
17For example, if hours satisfy H = Hˆ(1+ η˜) for some i.i.d. random noise η˜, then the expected coeﬃcient on wH is
1/[H(1 + σ2)]. When we constrained the sample to couples where both spouses report positive hours, the estimated
weight on the labor income of the secondary earner is .83. While still less than one, suggesting that hours of work
are more variable for secondary earners than for primary earners even among those with positive hours, this eﬀect is
now much less strong.
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How does the tax base suggested by these results correspond to current law? The results in
column 5 of Table 1 imply that the weight on interest income is 1.7 times the weight on own
earnings. Interest income enters more strongly in the tax base than under current law, even though
the only reason for its presence is to help in forecasting unobserved ability. The estimated weight
on dividend income in this speciﬁcation is 0.18, suggesting the inclusion of dividend income but at
a more favorable rate, as under current law.
The suggested treatment of mortgage and property tax payments diﬀers dramatically, however,
from current law. Rather than allowing these payments as a deduction, the results instead suggest
imposing additional taxes on households based on these expenditures, particularly property tax
payments. Note, though, that property tax payments are not currently deductible for households
that do not itemize or for those who are subject to the AMT. The 2005 President's Advisory Panel
on Federal Tax Reform also proposed eliminating the deductibility of property tax payments, and
severely restricting the deductibility of mortgage payments, moving the tax code towards the tax
base suggested by our initial results.18
All of these regressions report results forecasting wage rates in a year using various information
from that year in use in the tax code. From a lifecycle perspective, however, the individual's ability
to pay should depend on average wage rates over time and not just the wage rate in any one year.
When wage rates ﬂuctuate over time, for example, current wage rates and current earnings would
be more closely linked than they are from a lifecycle perspective, leaving less potential role for other
indicators.19 To test the sensitivity of our results, we rerun the regressions from Table 1 using instead
as a dependent variable a measure of the individual's permanent wage rate.20 Results are reported
in Table 1a. As expected, the R2 of the regression falls, since current earnings predict permanent
wage rates less well than they predict current wage rates, in the process resulting in an increased
role for the remaining indicators of ability. In particular, the role of interest income, dividends and
property taxes (all of which are potential proxies for permanent income) is strengthened, while the
eﬀect on the coeﬃcient on mortgage payments (which are likely to ﬂuctuate singiﬁcantly over time
and are less cleanly related to permanent income) is small.
Our leap, though, from regression results to the desired tax base is very casual. The aim of the
next section is to think through this link more carefully.
The estimates for the function f(.) can also be revealing. In Figure 1, we graph our estimates for
the forecasted average wage rate for a couple as a function of just the couple's average labor income.
Here, we ﬁnd that the forecasted average wage rate is roughly proportional to average labor income
for those with average earnings above about $50,000. Reported earnings are much less informative
18We do not model alternative rationales for these deductions such as potential externalities from house ownership
and local government expenditures.
19As an extreme example, if all individuals have the same age-wage rate proﬁle but are observed at diﬀerent ages,
then current earnings help forecast current wage rates, but have no use in forecasting an individual's average wage
rate over her lifetime.
20Speciﬁcally, we used as the dependent variable the forecasted wage rate at age 40, standardized to the earnings
levels in year 2001, for that individual estimated based on a regression of log(wages) against a ﬁxed eﬀect, age
dummies, and year dummies (all gender-speciﬁc).
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about wage rates, however, among couples with lower earnings. If income for those earning below
$50,000 is not very informative about earnings ability, then any redistribution within this poorer
segment of the population provides limited equity gains while still generating important eﬃciency
costs.
3 Theory
3.1 Initial derivation
When there are multiple indicators that are jointly useful in forecasting earnings ability, how should
the tax base be designed? To assess this, we begin with an analysis of a single individual. Consider a
one-period economy consisting of H single individuals. Individual h has wage rate wh, labor income
Zh, a vector of consumption Ch, and some other observable indicators Xh that can potentially enter
the tax base.
Tastes for leisure and consumption vary arbitrarily across individuals. The utility function for
individual h is denoted U(Ch, Xh, Zh;wh, h), where h enters the utility function directly to capture
any heterogeneity in individual tastes. Here, labor income serves as a proxy for leisure, i.e. labor
(the complement of leisure) equals Zh/wh.
Tax payments are denoted by T (Bh), where the tax base Bh is some function of observables.
Assume in particular that Bh ≡ Zh+Xhα, to capture the typical structure of the income tax base.21
We assume that the marginal utility of income for an individual, denoted by UhY , simply depends
on the individual's wage rate at the observed market equilibrium, regardless of the hours of work
and the consumption bundle they choose. We assume that marginal utility is a declining function
of the wage rate.
To see more explicitly the assumed normalization of marginal utility, suppose that the utility
function U(C,X,Z;w, h) is some general cardinal representation of preferences for each individual.
At the particular date when we entertain the possibility of a reform, marginal utility of income is
given by g(w, h) ≡ UY (C(w, h), X(w, h), Z(w, h);w, h), where C, X, and Z denote the individual's
choices given the environment at that particular date. On equity grounds, we assume that the
marginal utility of income at that date depends just on the wage rate, so can be expressed by
some function UY (w). Consequently, the normalized marginal utility of each individual equals
UhY (C,X,Z; w˜) ≡ UY (w)g(w,h)UY (C,X,Z; w˜, h).22
The government's objective function is assumed to equal: max
∑
h
Uh +W (
∑
h
T (Bh)), where
W (.) is a concave function that reﬂects the aggregate utility that individuals receive from government
21Following actual tax law, we assume that the tax function does not vary with the age or other characteristics
of the individual. We also assume that the extra indicators Xh enter linearly in the tax schedule. See Golosov,
Tsyvinski, and Weinzierl (2009) for an analysis of taxation with heterogeneous discount rates where the additional
taxes can be a general function of Xh and Zh
22While unneeded in the following discussion, one may assume as well that the level of utility is also the same for
individuals who have the same wage rate.
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expenditures and/or the utility that oﬃcials extract through their control over tax revenue.23 Given
this objective function, the government has an incentive to collect revenue more so from individuals
with lower marginal utility of income, so higher wage rates. It does not observe wage rates, though,
so must rely on observable information. Any distributional gains depend on the average marginal
utility of income among those with a higher vs. a lower value of the available tax base. If the tax
base were entirely uninformative about wage rates, then these marginal utilities would be the same
at all values of the tax base. The more informative is the tax base about the unobserved wage rates,
the larger the diﬀerence in the average marginal utilities of income among those with a higher vs.
a lower value of the tax base, and so the larger the potential distributional gains from basing taxes
on this tax base.
The resulting ﬁrst-order condition for α (the parameter deﬁning the tax base) is:∑
h
(1− UhY )T ′(Bh)Xh = −
∑
h
T ′(Bh)
(
∂Zh
∂α
+ α
∂Xh
∂α
)
(2)
Here, the left-hand side measures the equity gain from transferring a given amount of revenue
from individuals to the government, where individual h pays an additional amount proportional to
T ′(Bh)Xh. The resulting net beneﬁt depends on the diﬀerence between the marginal value of public
funds, by normalization equal to one, and the marginal utility of private funds to each individual
h, UhY . The right-hand side measures the marginal excess burden created by this increase in tax
rates arising from any drop in either element in the tax base.
To shed more light on the left-hand side, we group individuals based on their initial tax base.
With some abuse of notation, group B contains all NB individuals with tax base equal to B.
Restating this ﬁrst-order condition,∑
B
NBT
′(B)E[(1− UhY )Xh|B] = −
∑
h
T ′(Bh)
(
∂Zh
∂α
+ α
∂Xh
∂α
)
(3)
Consider next an alternative tax change that alters the tax schedule T , holding α ﬁxed, so as
to raise just as much extra revenue from those in group B as occurs with the initial reform.24 The
resulting increase in tax payments for each individual in group B must then equal T ′(B)E[Xh|B].
The change in welfare resulting from this alternative tax change equals:∑
B
NBT
′(B)(1− E[UhY |B])E[Xh|B] = −
∑
h
T ′(Bh)
(
∂Zh
∂n
+ α
∂Xh
∂n
)
, (4)
where n denotes this alternative reform. If the initial tax structure is optimal, then any marginal
change from the existing optimal rate schedule must have no marginal eﬀect on welfare.
The question is then how expressions (3) and (4) compare. At the optimal tax base, both
expressions equal zero, and the diﬀerence then equals zero. Consider ﬁrst the diﬀerence between
23Without loss of generality, we normalize utilities so that W ′ = 1 at the existing policy.
24A similar approach has been used recently by Laroque (2005) and Kaplow (2006) to show that under separability
there is always a Pareto improving reform that eliminates diﬀerential taxation of bases other than labor income.
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the left-hand sides. This diﬀerence (capturing the gains from redistribution) equals:
−
∑
B
NBT
′(B)E [(Xh − E[Xh|B])UhY |B] = −
∑
B
NBT
′(B)cov(UhY , Xh|B). (5)
This is nonzero to the extent that information about Xh helps forecast UhY among those with the
same B. Recall that UhY = UY (wh) depends simply on the individual's wage rate. Therefore, this
expression implies an equity gain, supporting including X in the tax base to the extent that X
helps in discriminating between low and high wage-rate individuals who have the same B. If Xh
provides no information about wage rates, given B, then the covariance will be zero.
For example, assume that B represents labor income, while Xh is some form of consumption.
If consumption is simply a function of labor income, and does not vary across individuals with
diﬀerent wage rates but the same labor income, then the covariance will be zero. If tastes vary with
wage rates, even given labor income, however, then the covariance will be nonzero and there are
equity grounds for including Xh in the tax base.
Consider next the diﬀerence between the right-hand sides in expression (4), measuring the excess
burden from this compensated change in the tax base. Consider for illustration the special case
focused on in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), where consumption is weakly separable from leisure for
each individual. If a particular good comprises θ% of an individual's consumption, then a tax at
rate αT ′ on this good has the same marginal eﬀect on individual utility as a tax on labor income at
rate αθT ′, regardless of that individual's wage rate. When θ varies across individuals, the equivalent
increase in the labor tax rate varies across individuals. If those with high θ on average have the
same labor supply elasticity as those with low θ, however, then the commodity tax change has the
same impact on aggregate labor income,
∑
h Zh, as a change in the tax rate on labor income of
αE(θ)T ′.25
The eﬃciency eﬀects of the combined tax changes arising from changes in Xh can then be
expressed by
−
∑
h
T ′(Bh)α
(
∂Xh
∂α
− E(Xh|B)∂Xh
∂I
)
= −
∑
h
T ′(Bh)α
∂Xh
∂α
|c. (6)
Here, the expression in parentheses corresponds to the sum of the compensated price eﬀects on
Xh, as measured by the second expression in this equation, if the income eﬀects ∂Xh/∂I are not
correlated with Xh, given B, again corresonding to Assumption 2 in Saez (2002). Under these
assumptions, therefore, the marginal excess burden equals zero when α = 0, increases as α diﬀers
from zero, and more so the more responsive is Xh to its price. The same argument applies to the
eﬃciency terms involving Zh.
Our paper does not attempt to estimate these eﬃciency eﬀects. Instead, we focus on the size of
the redistributive eﬀects of tax reforms, as measured by expression (5). When these are nonzero,
the optimal value of α is also nonzero and would be set to balance distributional gains and eﬃciency
losses.
25This assumption corresponds to Assumption 2 in Saez (2002).
12
Figure 2 provides a possible graph of both the redistributive gains and the eﬃciency losses
generated by changes in α. Here, αˆ represents the value of α that maximizes the redistributive
gains, so where expression (5) equals zero (this is the value that we estimate in the paper). Under
the separability assumptions in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), eﬃciency is maximized at α = 0. In
general, the optimal value of α that accounts for both eﬃciency and equity considerations is α∗, a
value between zero and αˆ.26
3.2 Derivation for Married Couples Filing Jointly
Several further issues arise when considering the tax base for a tax on married couples, assuming
joint ﬁling.27 To begin with, only the couple's joint income from interest, dividends, and their joint
mortgage and property tax payments are observable in practice, given the ﬂexibility couples have
in changing the name of the owner of any given asset for tax purposes.28
An important new question is how any changes in tax liabilities are shared between the two
spouses. For simplicity, we assume that any tax change is equally divided between the two spouses.29
Decreasing the taxes on any married individual by a dollar then increases the utility of the couple
by .5(UpY +Us(p)Y ) ≡ U¯pY , where s(p) denote the spouse of any given primary earner p and where
U¯pY is deﬁned to equal the average marginal utility of income in the couple.
With joint taxation, the earnings of the secondary earner can potentially be treated diﬀerently
from that of the primary earner. If so, assume that the tax base for the couple under joint ﬁling
equals Bp = Zp + γZs(p) + αXp. For any γ 6= 1, the marginal tax rate varies between high and low
earners within a couple.
The equivalent to expression (5) used to characterize the optimal choice of α, now summed over
couples (primary earners) rather than over individuals becomes:
−
∑
B
NBT
′(B)E[U¯pY (Xp − E(Xp|B))|B] (7)
If earnings of the secondary earner are treated diﬀerently, then we have an additional expression
for the optimal γ: ∑
B
NBT
′(B)E[U¯hp(Zs(p) − E(Zs(p)))|B] (8)
Under the tax base that best approximates an ability tax, one or both of these expressions would
equal zero, depending on whether secondary earners can be taxed diﬀerently.
26With multiple dimensions of α, we instead solve for the vector of marginal distributional beneﬁts for changes in
the vector α. The marginal excess burden term then takes the form −Ωα for some matrix Ω. In the special case in
which the matrix Ω is diagonal, the marginal distributional gain at the optimum must be larger when the marginal
excess burden is larger.
27In order to decompose this analysis from that on single individuals, we hold ﬁxed the tax base for single individuals
when considering possible changes to the tax base for married couples.
28In community property states in the U.S., such changes in the nominal owner have no legal implications for
divorce settlements, though they can in other states.
29See the Appendix for a derivation justifying this assumption when the couple engages in Nash bargaining, where
each has a fall-back position equal to the utility he or she would have as a single individual, and where their bargaining
power is equal.
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3.3 Married Couples: Joint vs. Separate Filing
A number of countries tax married individuals separately. The U.S. provides this as an option
as well, though relatively few married individuals make use of it. Can a case be made on equity
grounds for joint vs. separate ﬁlings?
We derived the optimal tax base on equity grounds under joint ﬁling in the previous section.
What would the optimal tax base be instead, assuming separate ﬁling? Here we assume the same
tax schedule for both primary and secondary earners, so need to assess the welfare eﬀects on both
spouses from modifying the tax base.30 Again we assume that the combined tax change is shared
equally between the two spouses.
With separate ﬁling, there is also a policy choice about how to deal with joint assets and
liabilities. One approach is to base the law on legal ownership and liability for each asset, giving the
couple substantial ﬂexibility to reassign ownership to the spouse facing the lower marginal tax rate,
in order to minimize taxes. The approach we presume instead is that the tax law assigns half of their
joint assets and liabilities to each spouse. To facilitate the comparison with other speciﬁcations,
we always include joint assets nad liabilities as regressors (including a half would simply scale the
coeﬃcient).
Consider then the eﬀects of a marginal change in α on a couple, taking into account the eﬀects
on the tax liabilities of both spouses. The resulting term equivalent to that on the left-hand side of
equation (1) is: ∑
p
(1− U¯pY )[T ′(Bp)Xp + T ′(Bs(p))Xp] =
∑
h
(1− U¯hY )T ′(Bh)Xh (9)
Here, the ﬁrst expression is summed over primary earners, so over p, while the second term is
summed over individuals, h. Note that this second expression is identical to the term on the left-
hand side of equation 1, except that marginal utility is for the couple rather than for the individual.
With this reinterpretation, we can then follow the previous derivation, implying that the optimal
tax base on distributional grounds satisﬁes
−
∑
B
NBT
′(B)E
[
U¯hY (Xh − E[Xh|B])|B
]
= 0 (10)
The question then is how to compare the welfare resulting from use of separate vs. joint ﬁling.
Consider the welfare eﬀect of a shift from joint ﬁling to separate ﬁling, with a compensating transfer
designed to leave the expected taxes paid by those with any given joint-ﬁling tax base unchanged.
The resulting impact on welfare equals∑
U¯pY (T
S(Bp) + T
S(Bs(p))− E(
∑
s
TS |Bjp)) (11)
Here, TS denotes the tax schedule for an individual assuming separate ﬁling, Bp (Bs(p)) is the
optimal tax base estimated above under separate ﬁling for the primary (secondary) earner, Bjp is
30We again hold ﬁxed the tax base for single individuals when considering possible changes to the tax base for
married couples ﬁling separately.
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the tax base for the couple under joint ﬁling, while E(
∑
s
TS |Bjp) measures the expected tax payments
by the couple under separate ﬁling, conditional on Bjp.
3.4 Lifecycle considerations
All of the above derivations focus on a static setting in which individuals are observed and taxed in
one year only. The ability of an individual is then measured based on their wage rate in that year.
These derivations ignore, though, that individuals can smooth consumption through borrowing and
lending, so that their marginal utility of income should depend on their earnings ability throughout
their life. In addition, they are aﬀected by a change in the tax law throughout their life, and not
just in one year.
How would the prior results change if we take into account these lifecycle considerations? The
ﬁrst question is how to characterize the marginal utility of an individual, given the set of wage rates
they face at all diﬀerent ages: UY (w1, ...wT ) . In general, individuals will diﬀer in the weights they
would place on wage rates at diﬀerent ages, depending on the time pattern of their desired labor
supplies. As before, we seek to develop a measure of marginal utility of income that depends on
earnings ability but not on tastes for how much to work, when to work, or what to consume. To
summarize the vector of annual wage rates by a scalar measure of ability, a natural approach would
be to use the present value of these wage rates:
∑
twt(1 + r)
−t ≡ w∗. Given that we do not observe
individuals over their entire career, we instead use for the lifetime wage rate the forecasted wage
rate evaluated at age 40 using earnings levels in 2001 derived from a wage regression that includes
ﬁxed eﬀects and a full set of year and age-speciﬁc dummies, estimated separately by gender.31
If the value of α were to change, then the cumulative welfare impact of this change over the
life of the individual equals:
∑
h(1 − UCh(w∗)){
∑
t T
′(Bht)Xht(1 + r)−t} =
∑
t(1 + r)
−t[
∑
h(1 −
UCh(w
∗))T ′(Bht)Xht] . As long as the composition of the population is stable over time, we can
evaluate the expression in brackets at any given date in order to evaluate the equity implications
of a tax reform. The only change from our prior expressions is then in the use of a lifetime rather
than an annual wage rate for each individual.
31There are of course many questions that can be raised here. Shouldn't diﬀerent weights be applied to wage
rates at diﬀerent ages, for example because labor supplies are systematically diﬀerent at diﬀerent ages? Here, we
conﬁne our sample to individuals in prime-earning years, making this issue of secondary importance. If individuals
can borrow and lend over time and have full information, then ﬂuctuations in wage rates across years are beneﬁcial,
since labor supply can be reallocated from low-wage-rate to high-wage-rate years. Without full information, though,
these ﬂuctuations impose risk-bearing costs. By ignoring the variation in wage rates, we implicitly presume that
these two eﬀects are on average oﬀsetting. We also ignore possible liquidity constraints, which when binding imply
that the marginal utility of consumption depends on current but not future wage rates. Our static results are instead
appropriate if individuals are systematically liquidity constrained.
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4 Estimation given theory
Our initial empirical work provided suggestive evidence about the possible value of various obser-
vations about individuals in addition to their labor income in the design of the tax base. The value
of these other indicators in forecasting wage rates can easily vary though across individuals. Based
on the theory (as summarized for example by expression (7)), we ﬁnd that any additional ability to
forecast wage rates is more important for those individuals with a higher marginal utility of income
facing a higher marginal tax rate.
Our aim in this section is ﬁrst to test whether the optimal value of α diﬀers from current law,
and then to approximate the value of α that is most attractive on equity grounds, given the theory.
We do this ﬁrst in a static setting, and then in a lifecycle context. We evaluate the gains from use
of additional indicators assuming either that married couples ﬁle jointly or ﬁle separately. Given
these results, we can then compare the equity gains from joint vs. separate ﬁling.
According to the theory, the optimal tax base for a married couple ﬁling jointly should satisfy
equation 7.32 This equation can be reexpressed as follows:
−
∑
B
NBT
′(B)E[U¯pY (Xp − E(Xp|B))|B)] =
−
∑
B
NBT
′(B)E(XpU¯pY |B) +
∑
B
NBT
′(B)E(Xp|B)E(U¯pY |B)] =
−
∑
p
T ′(Bp)XpU¯pY +
∑
p
T ′(Bp)XpE(U¯pY |B)
(12)
The resulting ﬁrst term can immediately be calculated, once we have functional forms for T (.) and
U¯Y . Evaluating the second term requires evaluating E(U¯hY |B).33 Conditional on this expression,
the second term can also immediately be calculated.
Deriving the equivalent expression for the optimal tax base for married couples ﬁling separately,
the only change in the expression is the replacement of the tax rates T ′ for married couples ﬁling
jointly with the tax rates for these individuals ﬁling separately.
The key next steps in estimation are choosing functional forms for T ′(.) and U¯Y . For T ′(.) we
simply use the observed tax rate schedule for couples ﬁling jointly in 1995. For married individuals
ﬁling separately, we used the tax schedule for single individuals in 1995.34
Our normative assumption is that UhY = u(wh). In our base case, we assume that u(wh) =
1/max(wh, $5), consistent with a utility function equaling w
1−γ
h /(1− γ) with γ = 1, and assuming
that social-safety-net programs assure a minimum standard of living equivalent to what would be
faced by someone with a wage rate equal to $5. As robustness checks, we also report some results
for alternative utility functions (other values for γ) and also for a minimum eﬀective wage rate of
$3.
32For now, we ignore the possibility of taxing secondary earnings diﬀerently.
33Note that this expression does not vary across the ﬁrst-order conditions for each element in α, which provides an
important computational advantage.
34Unfortunately, the NBER Taxsim program did not include a procedure for married couples ﬁling separately, so
we approximated their tax schedule with that for single individuals.
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Estimation is done on the same sample from the PSID used in section 2, and implemented in R,
relying on the np package from Hayﬁeld and Racine (2008) for implementation of semiparametric
and nonparametric components.
We construct an empirical estimate of E[U¯hY |B] by a nonparametric (kernel) regression of U¯hY
on Z + αX. We select the bandwidth by least-squares cross validation.35 We then search for the
values of the vector α that simultaneously satisfy the above ﬁrst-order conditions for each element
of α. The number of moment conditions is the same as the number of elements of α and hence the
optimal value is just identiﬁed.
Our ﬁrst aim is to test whether the existing tax law is consistent with the theory. To do this, we
take the actual tax base under U.S. tax law for married couples ﬁling jointly in 1995 as our starting
point, and considered modiﬁcations to this tax base, changing the weight on each of the available
indicators, calculated based on equation (7), and perhaps equation (8). The existing tax base in
the U.S. in that year includes the sum of joint earnings plus dividend and interest income, minus
mortgage payments and property tax payments among those who itemize.36 If the existing tax base
makes best use of available information, then there should be no gain from introducing non-zero
weights on any of the indicator variables we focus on. Through estimating the optimal weights on
these indicators, we approximate the tax base that does best on equity grounds.37
Results are reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2. In column 1, we ﬁnd that each of the
available indicators (except for interest income) is statistically signiﬁcant, indicating that each is
correlated with the couple's marginal utility of income even after controlling for the existing tax
base. The results imply that the tax base that does best on equity grounds would virtually eliminate
dividends from the existing tax base. However, it would maintain interest income in the tax base,
even though the only aim in the design of the tax base is to approximate an ability tax. In
addition, we ﬁnd that the itemized deductions for mortgage payments and property tax payments
are not appropriate on equity grounds. Property tax payments in particular serve as a useful proxy
for ability.
When we allow spousal earnings to have a diﬀerent weight than earnings of the primary earner,
we ﬁnd that spousal earnings should receive more than twice as much weight (a weight of 1 +
1.35 = 2.35). This higher weight compensates for the lower hours worked by the secondary earner.
Ignoring any randomness in labor income, given wage rates, this would be consistent with the
weighted average hours worked by the secondary earner (with those with a low wage rate being
35Because least-squares cross validation is computationally intensive, we implement it by optimizing at a given
bandwidth, performing cross validation at the optimum, and iterating until the bandwidth converges. In practice,
results are not very sensitive to the choice of bandwidth.
36We constructed a one-dimenstional proxy for the tax base by mapping the 1995 tax liability that accounts
for available information (including state information, children, AMT etc., as described in the appendix) into the
corresponding AGI level for a married couple with no kids (and using the actual AGI in cases when tax liability was
zero).
37Our results are only approximations since we do not control for possible general equilibrium changes in prices
or wage rates due to a change in the tax law and do not control for changes in the marginal utility of income for
each individual caused by changes in their tax liabilities. These ﬁgures also do not take into account any eﬃciency
costs/beneﬁts arising from a change in the tax base.
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weighted heavily) being only 1/2.35 times the average hours worked by the primary earner.38When
spousal earnings receive more weight, the other indicators also become more important. Each help
in forecasting hours of work for the secondary earner, controlling for spousal earnings. When these
earnings receive more weight, the corrections need to receive more weight as well.
Note that the qualitative results are broadly the same as we found in Table 1, with interest
income and property tax payments being particularly useful in forecasting ability, after controlling
for earnings. This is true even though those with low wage rates facing high marginal tax rates
receive much more weight, and even though our starting point is the existing tax base rather than
joint earnings.
Does the existing tax base even do as well as a tax base that simply equals the couples joint
labor income? To test this, we use an analogue of equation (11) to estimate the welfare eﬀect of a
shift from the actual tax base towards one where taxes are based on just the couple's joint earnings,
holding expected taxes unchanged at each value of the actual tax base.39 In order to convert this
utility gain to a dollar ﬁgure, we divide through by the sum of the welfare weights. The resulting
ﬁgure then is a weighted average of the change in tax liabilities, weighting by the marginal utility
of income. Here we ﬁnd a weighted average gain of $173: a tax base limited to joint earnings does
slightly better on equity grounds than does the actual tax base.
We next tested to see to what extent further equity gains are feasible, starting from a tax base
equal to joint earnings, by making use of the available indicators. Here, we are implicitly testing
the separability assumption in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) that consumption decisions convey no
information about ability other than what is already contained in reported earnings. Statistically
signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for particular variables reject separability for those variables, indicating that
such variables contain usable information about ability. The speciﬁc coeﬃcient estimates again
provide an approximation to the optimal tax base.
Estimation results for married couples ﬁling jointly are reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table
2. Results are broadly similar to those implied by the coeﬃcients in columns (1) and (2). We
ﬁnd in column (3) that on equity grounds dividends should not be included in the tax base, while
the coeﬃcient on interest income is virtually equal to one, consistent with the current tax law.
Mortgage payments provide little or no added information in forecasting ability, so should not enter
into the tax base without some other justiﬁcation. As before, we ﬁnd that property tax payments
not only should not be allowed as a tax deduction but instead should be taxable, since those who
make higher property tax payments tend to be more able, for any given value of joint earnings.
When we allow for a separate tax rate on the labor income of primary vs. secondary earners in
column (4), we now ﬁnd that the weight on the labor income of the secondary earner should be 2.5
times that on the primary earner. The other coeﬃcients again increase, roughly in proportion to
38According to the data, the ratio of the average hours worked by secondary earners to those of primary earners is
0.60. The estimation procedure, though, gives much more weight to those with low wage rates, and these individuals
have much lower hours.
39In calculating the alternative tax payments, we use the existing tax schedule in 1995 and the couple's joint
earnings.
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the change in the weight on the income of the secondary earner.
Estimation results for the optimal tax base for married couples ﬁling separately are reported
in column (5) of Table 2. We now ﬁnd yet more weight given to the supplementary sources of
information. These results apparently are driven by the extra weight being put on approximating
well the tax base for secondary earners with low earnings, but also low hours of work, who are not
as poor as they would appear based on reported labor income.
In column 6 of Table 2, we consider a somewhat counterintuitive tax system, with separate
ﬁling but the possibility of making taxable income depend on the spouse's income. Interestingly,
this speciﬁcation ﬁnds a very signiﬁcant role for spousal income and eliminates the importance of
mortgages and property taxes. In particular, in forecasting the wage rate of the secondary earner,
we ﬁnd that the head's income does a better job than mortgage and property tax payments in
forecasting hours of work (as can be seen by comparing R2 in columns 3 and 4).
Table 3 provides some robustness checks. In columns 1-2 of Table 3, we reestimate the results
in columns 3-4 of Table 2, but now assume that the minimum eﬀective wage rate is $3, rather than
$5. Remarkably little changes. In columns 3-4, we assume a less concave utility function (γ = .5),
while in columns 5-6 we assume a more concave utility function (γ = 2 ). The reestimates of column
3 of Table 2 result in very small changes, so this speciﬁcation is very robust. The reestimates of
column 4 of Table 2 prove to be much more sensitive. The more weight that is put on individuals
with lower wage rates, the higher the estimated weight on spousal income, and on most of the other
indicator variables. This pattern is entirely consistent with our prior explanation that lower-wage-
rate individuals have lower hours than do those with higher wage rates, and these lower wage rate
individuals receive more weight in the reestimation results in Table 3.
Does separate ﬁling do a better job than joint ﬁling in approximating an ability tax? To conduct
this test, we make use of the same procedure used in comparing a tax on joint earnings with a tax
based on the current tax base. When we compare the joint ﬁling speciﬁcation characterized by the
results in column 1 of Table 3 to the separate ﬁling speciﬁcation in column 3, there is a gain from
separate ﬁling corresponding to just $51.65. When we compare the joint ﬁling in speciﬁcation 2 to
the separate ﬁling in speciﬁcation 4, the gain changes to $113.75: In both cases the diﬀerence is
small suggesting that both separate and joint ﬁling do equally well on equity grounds.
We next examine the sensitivity of our results to lifecycle considerations. Even with the PSID,
we observe individuals over only part of their lifecycle, with the observed age range varying by
individual. To proceed, we forecasted each individual's wage rate at age 40, based on the earnings
levels in year 1995, using a regression of log(wages) against an individual ﬁxed eﬀect, age dummies,
and year dummies, with the regression estimated separately for each gender. We then used this
estimated wage rate instead of the individual's wage rate in any given year in the various formulas
used to calculate the optimal tax base. Results for joint ﬁling, comparable to those in columns (3)
and (4) of Table 2, are reported in Table 4. Here, we ﬁnd that more (and in some cases much more)
weight is given to each of the indicators than was found in Table 2. If annual earnings ﬂuctuate
due to random variation in wage rates, annual earnings are less eﬀective at forecasting average
wage rates than in forecasting that year's wage rate. This leaves more room for other sources of
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information when average wage rates are used in measuring the marginal utility of income.
One possible reason why these various indicators can help in forecasting wage rates is that they
reﬂect decisions based on the individual's permanent earnings rather than earnings in that year.
To test to see to what degree this explains the patterns we have seen in the data, we re-estimate
the lifetime speciﬁcation allowing full income averaging over an individual's life, so that the tax
base is average earnings plus a weighted sum of the average values of each of the indicators over
the individual's life.40 The resulting estimates for the tax base, using the permanent component
for each of the variables, are reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4. In column 3, income of the
lower earner is given equal weight, while it can have a diﬀerent weight in column 4. As expected,
comparing the estimates in columns 3-4 to those in columns 1-2, more of the variation in lifetime
wage rates can be explained by lifetime earnings than by annual earnings, leaving less room for
the various indicators to help in forecasting lifetime wage rates. The coeﬃcient on property tax
payments in particular falls substantially, suggesting that this indicator is large particularly in years
when labor supply is low.41 In contrast, dividend receipts now receive more weight, suggesting that
over the course of a lifetime those with high dividends work fewer hours. The smaller coeﬃcient in
the annual data could arise from random variation in dividend receipts, or from a tendency to own
more stock at ages with high labor supply. Interest income in contrast tends to be high in years
with low hours of work, but has little association with hours over the course of a lifetime.
Note also that the overall quality of the ﬁt in columns 3-4 is much higher than in columns 1-2
of Table 4, implying important equity gains from lifetime averaging.
5 Equity vs. Eﬃciency Gains
In our empirical work, we focused on estimating αˆ, the tax base that would be optimal taking into
account solely distributional considerations. The choice of tax base clearly has important eﬀects on
economic eﬃciency as well. We have made no attempt to estimate the marginal excess burden of
any change in the tax base.
Even without any quantitative information about the size of eﬃciency eﬀects, however, we can
at least take into account the sign of these eﬃciency eﬀects. Consider each of the additional sources
of information in turn:
a) Spousal income: On equity grounds, our results suggest that spousal labor income should
be weighted more heavily than is the labor income of the primary earner, reﬂecting lower average
hours of work for secondary earners. Yet on eﬃciency grounds, the labor income of secondary
earners should be taxed more lightly, given the greater sensitivity of labor supply to the net-of-tax
wage rate among secondary earners. Having the same weight on the labor income of secondary
40Since we do not have data for an individual's entire life, we forecast the permanent component of earnings and of
each indicator using the same approach we used in forecasting the permanent component in wage rates: we regress
the log of each indicator against a ﬁxed eﬀect, age dummies, and year dummies, separately by gender. The forecasted
value for someone aged 40 in year 1995 is then used to measure the permanent component of each variable.
41This could occur, for example, if school-aged kids induce a couple to move to a community with good schools
(and high property taxes), but also to spend more time away from work caring for the kids.
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earners and primary earners can be interpreted as providing a rough balancing between equity and
eﬃciency considerations.
b) Interest and dividend income: Here, we ﬁnd that under the ideal tax base focusing
solely on distributional considerations, both dividends and interest income would be included in the
tax base, with the weights varying depending on the degree of income averaging. There is a large
literature assessing the optimal tax treatment of savings, focusing solely on eﬃciency considerations.
The recent literature suggests a positive tax on savings on eﬃciency grounds.42 As a result, there
appear to be reasons to include income from capital in the tax base on both equity and eﬃciency
grounds.
c) Mortgage interest payments: Here, on equity grounds, we forecast that these payments
should not play any nontrivial role in the tax base. The current deductibility of mortgage interest
cannot be justiﬁed on equity grounds.
d) Property tax payments: Our results indicate that property tax payments provide valuable
information in forecasting wage rates, even given labor income. On equity grounds, not only should
these expenditures not be deductible, but they should instead add to the tax base. These equity
costs raise questions, though, about the current tax treatment.43
We have shown in the paper how to estimate the implications of equity considerations on the
choice of the tax base. Rigorously incorporating eﬃciency considerations is a natural extension.
42One strand of this literature, reviewed in Golosov et al. (2006), shows that a positive tax rate on capital income
makes it easier to redistribute between high ability and low ability individuals, by making it less attractive for
high ability individuals to save to ﬁnance consumption during periods with low future earnings. A second strand,
exempliﬁed by Conesa et al. (2009), argues that taxation of capital income serves as an indirect way to impose
age-dependent taxes, an issue we ignore.
43Perhaps the current deductibility of property tax payments serves as another mechanism to aid childen, by
inducing parents to spend more on their education.
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A Behavior of Married Couples
Assume that married couples choose their joint labor supplies and joint consumption levels based
on Nash bargaining over the division of their joint resources. Under Nash bargaining, each spouse
has as a fall-back position the utility he or she would have as a single individual.
Denote the utility function of the husband by UH(CH , LH), where CH is consumption and LH
is leisure. Similarly, let the utility function of the wife be UW (CW , LW ). If single, consumption
and leisure satisfy CHS = wH(1− LHS)− THS , and similarly for the wife, where THS denotes tax
payments when single. As a married couple, they face a joint budget constraint equal to
CHM + CWM = wH(1− LHM ) + wW (1− LWM )− TM (13)
Under Nash bargaining, they choose their consumption levels and labor supplies to maximize(
UH(CHM , LHM )− UH(CHS , LHS)
)(
UW (CWM , LWM )− UW (CWS , LWS)
)
(14)
where we implicitly assume here that the two spouses have equal bargaining power. To simplify the
resulting algebra, we take a ﬁrst-order approximation to each change in utility, e.g. UHM −UHS =
UHMC ∆CH + U
HM
L ∆LH .
The resulting ﬁrst-order conditions can be combined to show that labor supply is allocated
eﬃciently between the two spouses:
UHML
UHMC
=
UWML
UWMC
wnH
wnW
(15)
Here, wn denotes the net-of-tax wage rate on marginal labor supply. Unless, total resources
change, there is no impact of marriage then on labor supplies.
Given this result, the ﬁrst-order conditions for the consumption of each spouse can be expressed
by
∆CW = ∆CH +
(
∆LH
wnH
wnW
−∆LW
)UWML
UWMC
(16)
If each couple spends the same fraction of any extra resources they receive on consumption vs.
leisure, then we infer that ∆CW = ∆CH .
B Data
We rely on PSID data for 1968-1997, 1999 and 2001. We extract the following categories of variables
(further details follow): demographic variables (gender, age, marital status, number of children, state
of residence), hours, labor income, business and farm income, business and farm assets, unemploy-
ment income, mortgage payments, property taxes, dividend, interest income and other categories
of capital income when available. We rely on this information to construct the following variables
used in the analysis: wages, labor income, dividend, interest and trust income (disaggregated when
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possible), mortgage payments, property taxes, marginal tax rates, total federal and state tax liabil-
ity. Because in some cases questions in PSID change over time, we devoted considerable eﬀort to
come up with deﬁnitions that are consistent over time. We discuss our procedure for each variable
in more detail below.
Generally, we restrict the sample to the Survey Research Center sample which is a random
equal probability sample of the U.S. population. We exclude the so called Survey of Economic
Opportunities sample that was not consistently covered throughout the whole period (changes
occurred in 1997) and is not representative of the U.S. population as a whole.. We also exclude the
Latino sample that was followed for a short period of time only. We use in our analysis data for
heads and wives, and do not rely on information about a person when she was a dependent. We
do not use PSID sampling weights anywhere. We often weight observations by either the average
family labor income or the average own labor income depending on whether family-level or individual
observations are used. Unless otherwise indicated, we adjust dollar variables for changes in the price
level using the CPI-U index, using 2001 as the baseline.
Labor income. We construct full labor income by adding up wages and salaries, bonuses, overtime
payments, tips, commission income, professional practice income, miscellaneous labor income and
labor part of business/farm income. The last of these variables is imputed in PSID with rules
regarding spousal shares and labor/capital division varying somewhat over time, but with not
enough information to adjust to any standard deﬁnition. This is one reason why we usually exclude
individuals owning a business.
Asset income. PSID has always included questions about some forms of capital income but due
to changes in how the questions were asked and changes in the detail of breakdown of asset income
into various categories, we can only construct a consistent deﬁnition starting in 1984. For 1984-1992,
we construct a single variable dividend, interest and trust income for both heads and wives. This
variable speciﬁcally excludes other categories of asset income that cause deﬁnitional problems prior
to 1984 such as rental income, alimony, business and farm income, market gardening and roomers
and boarders. It is constructed separately for heads and wives but in practice we use it aggregated
to the family level. Starting in 1993, we can actually separate dividend, interest and trust income
for both heads and wive and we do so.
Wage rate. While a wage rate measure is already available in the PSID, our labor income measure
does not exactly coincide with the PSID measure and therefore we calculated the wage rate by
dividing our deﬁnition of labor income by the hours reported in the PSID. We do so for those who
work more than 500 hours in a given year. For those who work at most 500 hours, we impute
the wage rate by ﬁrst regressing log wages when working more than 500 hours on the full set of
year and age dummies and individual ﬁxed eﬀects, for men and women separately, and then using
ﬁtted values from this regression (accounting for the individual ﬁxed eﬀect) in years when a person
works 500 hours or less. Although we use data starting with 1984 for most of the analysis, the wage
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imputations and lifetime wage calculations use wage rates starting from 1968.
Deductions. Information about mortgage payments and property tax payments is systematically
available in the PSID starting in 1984. In some cases mortgage payments include property taxes.
In those cases, we reduce mortgage payments by separately reported property tax if the latter is
not greater than mortgage payments.
Other issues. State of residence is not available in years 1994-1997. In these cases, we assign
state of residence from the nearest year among 1992, 1993, 1999, 2001 for which state of residence
is available.
We use the term secondary income to denote the spouse with lower income.
Taxes. We compute tax liability by relying on the TAXSIM calculator available at http://www.
nber.org/taxsim. Our calculation accounts for: labor income of both spouses, unemployment
insurance, dividends and interest income (separately starting with 1993, jointly and treated as
interest income prior to 1993). We account for the number of children for the purpose of computing
exemptions/child tax credit. We assign ﬁling status of married ﬁling jointly (to those married),
single (to those single without children) or head of households (single with children). Because our
analysis is performed for those between ages of 25 and 60, age exemptions are not an issue. We use
TAXSIM to compute federal and state tax liability and marginal tax rates, while accounting for the
information listed above. We use federal marginal tax rates unless otherwise indicated (although
state taxes do aﬀect federal taxes through their eﬀect on itemized deductions).
We use marginal tax rates for weighting in the optimal tax base formulae. The 1995 tax rates
are obtained by ﬁrst indexing all the dollar variables to 1995 values using the Social Security
Administration wage index and then applying the 1995 law. For speciﬁcations with separate ﬁling,
we use the hypothetical tax rate that would arise if the indiviudual were single. We allocate half of
the children to each parent, with the odd child going to the mother. Own unemployment income, if
any, is used. Half of capital income is allocated to each spouse. We multiply property and mortgage
interest payments by 2/3 to rudimentarily account for returns to scale in these kinds of payments
occurring within a family. Finally, we assign the marital status of single or head of household,
depending on the presence of children, and apply the current law.
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Table 1: Predicting wages
Married Individuals Married Married Married Couples
Linear Head Spouse
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Spousal income −0.408
(0.018)
Dividends 0.359 0.378 0.052 0.423 0.176 0.483
(0.032) (0.042) (0.011) (0.023) (0.053) (0.059)
Interest 1.173 1.493 0.559 1.893 1.700 1.702
(0.039) (0.080) (0.018) (0.094) (0.070) (0.067)
Mortgage 0.418 0.432 −0.034 0.600 0.223 0.019
(0.022) (0.026) (0.011) (0.045) (0.041) (0.037)
Property Tax 2.522 3.056 −0.191 5.126 1.381 1.961
(0.058) (0.105) (0.045) (0.155) (0.043) (0.137)
Bandwidth 2344.369 721.082 3290.666 2700.804 3455.407
R2 0.650 0.629 0.820 0.341 0.747 0.763
N 22736 22736 11351 11379 11396 11390
Table 1a: Predicting permanent wages
Married Individuals Married Married Married Couples
Linear Head Spouse
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Spousal income −0.257
(0.021)
Dividends 0.751 0.825 0.601 1.251 0.851 1.357
(0.018) (0.094) (0.069) (0.112) (0.107) (0.033)
Interest 3.188 4.270 3.226 7.579 7.597 4.573
(0.038) (0.220) (0.147) (0.379) (0.212) (0.032)
Mortgage 0.031 0.187 −0.153 0.362 0.116 0.374
(0.013) (0.042) (0.046) (0.084) (0.076) (0.047)
Property Tax 4.053 6.262 2.742 9.770 6.419 8.350
(0.033) (0.208) (0.199) (0.435) (0.318) (0.076)
Bandwidth 1579.078 3676.866 6220.167 7333.920 4655.394
R2 0.508 0.501 0.625 0.254 0.552 0.567
N 22726 22726 11331 11368 11381 11391
27
Table 2: Optimal tax base
Using tax base Joint Filing Separate ﬁling
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Spousal Income 1.353 1.513 3.492
(0.167) (0.191) (0.041)
Dividends −0.739 −0.575 0.049 0.224 0.305 0.419
(0.139) (0.240) (0.093) (0.212) (0.068) (0.028)
Interest 0.149 0.787 1.055 1.884 3.415 1.561
(0.387) (0.196) (0.071) (0.344) (0.312) (0.244)
Mortgage 0.883 1.394 0.184 0.707 2.204 −0.185
(0.114) (0.228) (0.106) (0.217) (0.414) (0.085)
Property Tax 1.883 3.939 1.451 3.826 9.223 0.358
(0.399) (0.883) (0.361) (1.058) (1.205) (0.404)
Bandwidth 3926.355 5138.061 2398.916 6270.476 2153.311 550.600
R2 0.581 0.575 0.588 0.580 0.384 0.430
OLS R2 0.440 0.484 0.453 0.477 0.291 0.404
N 11357 11369 11355 11368 22681 22747
Table 3: Sensitivity of the optimal tax base
Minimum wage = $3 γ = 0.5 γ = 2
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Spousal income 1.521 0.873 2.700
(0.247) (0.105) (0.538)
Dividends −0.028 0.115 0.110 0.243 −0.079 0.153
(0.164) (0.228) (0.154) (0.193) (0.130) (0.398)
Interest 1.112 1.413 0.913 1.435 1.559 2.277
(0.356) (0.343) (0.187) (0.247) (0.278) (0.440)
Mortgage 0.111 0.328 0.276 0.526 0.191 0.927
(0.150) (0.252) (0.106) (0.147) (0.154) (0.503)
Property Tax 1.112 2.755 1.565 2.949 1.206 4.502
(0.683) (1.456) (0.342) (0.776) (0.713) (2.003)
Bandwidth 4012.444 3099.947 4076.863 5899.339 4055.656 6847.871
R2 0.485 0.492 0.656 0.647 0.460 0.468
OLS R2 0.358 0.391 0.548 0.567 0.297 0.338
N 11355 11368 11363 11364 11355 11397
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Table 4: Optimal tax base
Fixed eﬀect wage All ﬁxed eﬀects
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Spousal Income 3.343 1.376
(1.646) (0.384)
Dividends 1.797 4.018 4.314 6.657
(0.114) (1.780) (0.144) (1.239)
Interest 5.673 12.398 0.204 2.892
(1.883) (11.935) (0.647) (3.062)
Mortgage 0.354 1.878 0.386 0.678
(0.270) (1.655) (0.264) (0.418)
Property Tax 9.329 24.196 1.275 2.283
(1.746) (12.506) (0.837) (1.081)
Bandwidth 5778.778 10467.022 5408.576 5911.344
R2 0.434 0.419 0.666 0.688
OLS R2 0.328 0.362 0.532 0.564
N 11340 11330 2668 2666
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